The concept of a tripartite agency of existence: body, soul, and god, does not completely parallel to Plato either. Plato believed in the physical world, the world of forms, and the greatest form of all: good. A superficial inspection would correlate these to body, soul, and god respectively, but this cannot work. First off, the world of forms, in Platonic terms, equates to god himself according to Augustine. The greatest form of all, however, can be no other than god as well. Plato's third realm, the realm of the perceivable, then must correlate to both Augustine's "body" and his "soul." This, however, cannot be since it is Plato's realm of forms which is also the realm of intellect, a concept paralleling Augustine's "soul." So apparently, Augustine has also created a third segment of Plato's divided line.
Pausanias discusses different kinds of Common Love. He says that if a person marries for money and gratifies his lover, this is Common ugly love. The wealthy person's love is not, because he was deceived. The deceiver still maintains Virtue. Pausanius says the same is true of the older Aphrodite's Love. The deceived maintains virtue as long as their intentions were seeded in virtue. For Pausanias virtue is the key to love. Love without virtue is inferior, Common Love.
The prerequisites before embarking on a metaphysical path requires the two following things: a belief in a God and the possibility of an afterlife. If these two concepts are not met, one will have trouble grasping the concepts of metaphysics. Also, if an individual has more traditional views of religion, this will also serve as an obstacle to learning metaphysics, as metaphysics takes a non-traditional route to religion, otherwise known as spirituality. Actually, this fact alone makes metaphysics a more flexible and graspable means of spirituality without rules and regulations, that almost anyone can grasp, other than the die-hard skeptics who are most likely out to disprove the concepts and not take advantage of them.
He then proceeds to eliminate the body and the senses from being without doubt, until he comes up with the one verifiable truth: Sensing? There can be no sensing in the absence of body; and besides I have seemed during sleep to apprehend things which does belong to me: it alone cannot be separated from me. I am, I exist. This is certain. How often? As often as I think. For it might indeed be that if I entirely ceased to think, I should thereupon altogether cease to exist. I am not at present admitting anything, that is to say, a mind an understanding or reason--terms the significance of which has hitherto been unknown to me. I am, then, a real thing, and really existent. What thing? I have said it a thinking thing. (Descartes, Rene, "Meditations," Struhl, Paula Rothenberg, and Struhl Karsten J., editors, Philosophy Now. Random House: 1980)
I have always considered that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be demonstrated by philosophical rather than theological argument, that is, the questions of the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. (Qtd in Ockman, William)
All three works have emphasized the transitory nature of the material world and the transcendence of the realm of rational thought, belief in god, or living in the ways of Krishna. Plato and the Gita especially emphasize the necessity of people doing what suits them best. Meanwhile the concept of an omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient god from which all existence must come from directly parallels Krishna and all of existence, mentality, sensation and thought existing within him.